We consider the role of the common prior for robust implementation in an environment with interdependent values. Speci cally, we investigate a model of public good provision which allows for negative and positive informational externalities. In the corresponding direct mechanism, the agents' reporting strategies are strategic complements with negative informational externalities and strategic substitutes with positive informational externalities.
Introduction
We investigate the role of the common prior assumption in robust implementation. Robust implementation requires that every equilibrium on every type space delivers outcomes consistent with a social choice function. By \every type space", we allow for multiple copies of the same payo type with di erent beliefs over the types of others; and we allow for non common prior type spaces.
In this paper we want to look at an intermediate notion of robustness: allowing all possible common prior type spaces.
We develop the arguments in the context of a public good model with interdependent values. We have used this speci c public good model as a leading example in our previous work on ex post implementation (see Bergemann and Morris (2007b) ), robust implementation in direct mechanisms (see Bergemann and Morris (2007c) ) and robust virtual implementation (see Bergemann and Morris (2007d) ). The current objective is to analyze the importance of the common prior assumption for the possibility of robust implementation. In particular, we identify when the necessary and su cient conditions for robust implementation depend on whether we allow for all types spaces (as in Bergemann and Morris (2007c) ) or only for all type spaces with a common prior. The public good model allows for positive as well as negative informational externalities.
When we consider the direct revelation mechanism, we show that the reporting strategies of the agents are strategic complements with negative informational externalities and strategic substitutes with positive informational externalities.
The analysis of the robust implementation with and without a common prior relies on epistemic results on incomplete information games. Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) and Aumann (1987) , respectively, reported formal epistemic arguments which -for complete information games -characterize the solution concepts of correlated equilibrium and rationalizability as the consequences of common knowledge of rationality with and without the common prior, respectively. In Bergemann and Morris (2007a) , we report belief free incomplete information generalizations of the solution concepts (incomplete information correlated equilibrium and incomplete information rationalizability), and their epistemic foundations; these solution concepts and results are variants/special cases of the work of Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) and Forges (1993) respectively. We apply these results to the direct mechanism design setting where the strategy space is simply the payo type space itself. In this environment, a speci c message of a payo type is incomplete information rationalizable if and only if there exists a type space and an interim equilibrium such that the message is an equilibrium action for a type with a given payo type in the type space. A similar result can be stated for the incomplete information correlated equilibrium. Namely, a message of a speci c payo type is an element of an incomplete information correlated equilibrium if and only if there exists a type space with a common prior for which the speci c message is an interim equilibrium action for a type with that payo type. With these epistemic results in the background, we can rephrase the conditions for robust implementation with and without common prior as establishing conditions for a unique solution under incomplete information correlated equilibrium and incomplete information rationalizability respectively. In the case of strategic complements the necessary and su cient conditions for robust implementation do not depend on the existence of a common prior. In other words, with strategic complements, if truthtelling is the unique incomplete information correlated equilibrium outcome, then truthtelling is also the unique incomplete information rationalizable outcome. This re ects the well known property of supermodular environments that multiple rationalizable outcomes occur only when there are multiple equilibria (see, e.g., Milgrom and Roberts (1990) ). In contrast, with strategic substitutes, the common prior assumption changes the implementation conditions. In particular, as the number of participating agents in the public good model increases, the conditions for a unique rationalizable outcome converge to requiring pure private values, whereas the conditions for robust implementation with a common prior are independent of the number of participating agents and accommodate moderate interdependence.
The public good example which we consider here has two notable features which facilitate the analysis. First, the willingness to pay of agent i for the public good is the weighted sum of the payo types of all the agents. The valuation of agent i is therefore identi ed by an aggregator which summarizes the private information of all agents in a one-dimensional variable. Second, the cost function of the public good is quadratic and the resulting ex post incentive compatible transfer of agent i is a quadratic function of the reports of the agents.
The quadratic payo environment leads to a linear best response property which allows us to analyze the reporting game in the direct mechanism as a potential game. The analysis of the incomplete information correlated equilibrium is then facilitated by using potential game arguments rst developed by Neyman (1997) for complete information games.
Setup
There are I agents. Player i has a payo type i 2 i , where each i = [0; 1] is a compact interval of the real line. Each agent gets utility from a social choice x 2 X, where X is a compact set, and transfers t i 2 R; his utility is given by u i (x; ) t i . A direct mechanism speci es the social choice as a function of the pro le of types, f : ! X, and a transfer rule for each agent, t i : ! R. Each agent sends an announcement of his type, a message, m i 2 i . This mechanism
is ex post incentive compatible if for all i, and m i :
A number of papers have described single crossing characterizations under which ex post incentive compatible transfers exist (e.g., Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) , Bergemann and V• alim• aki (2002) ). In this paper we focus on the case where they exist. Agent i's payo if the true type pro le is and the announced pro le is m is u
. By construction, truthtelling is an ex post equilibrium in the direct mechanism. We consider two solution concepts for this setting. The rst notion is incomplete information rationalizability.
De nition 1 (Incomplete Information Rationalizability)
The incomplete information rationalizable actions R = (R i )
for each k = 1; 2; :::; and
The second notion is the incomplete information version of the correlated equilibrium.
De nition 2 (Incomplete Information Correlated Equilibrium )
A probability distribution 2 ( ) is an incomplete information correlated equilibrium (ICE) of the direct mechanism if for each i and each measur-
We de ne C i ( i ) -the set of messages that can be played by type i in an incomplete information correlated equilibrium of the direct mechanism. We will say that m i 2 C i ( i ) if for each " > 0, there exists an ICE with
In Bergemann and Morris (2007a) we report the above solution concepts in a general game theoretic environment. We observe that the solution concepts R i ( i ) and C i ( i ) are \belief free" solution concepts in the sense that they do not refer to a speci c common prior or speci c beliefs or higher order beliefs of the agents. Rather, they represent the sets of actions which can be observed as rationalizable or correlated equilibrium actions for some beliefs of agent i given his payo type i . In Bergemann and Morris (2007a) , we show that incomplete information rationalizability and correlated equilibrium share the same epistemic properties as their complete information equivalents as outlined in the introduction. With these belief free notions in place, there is no further need to refer to beliefs and higher order beliefs of agent i. In consequence, we shall from now on refer to the payo type i simply as the type i of agent i.
A Public Good Example
We discuss the role and the importance of the common prior for robust implementation in a public good example with interdependent values. In the nal section, we discuss which special properties of the environment are used in establishing our results. We consider the provision of a public good x 2 R + . The utility of each agent i for the public good is given by u i (x; ) = h i ( ) x; where
aggregates the agents' payo types. Thus the utility of agent i depends on his own type with weight one and the types of the other agents with a weight 2 R. The weight represents the preference interdependence among the agents. If = 0, we have a private values model, while < 0 represents negative informational externalities and > 0 represents positive informational externalities. The cost of establishing the public good is given by c (x) = 1 2 x 2 . The planner must choose x to maximize social welfare, i.e., the sum of gross utilities minus the cost of the public good. The socially optimal level of the public good is therefore equal to:
The generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) transfers are given by:
The transfers ft i ( )g I i=1 of the generalized VCG mechanism guarantee that truthtelling is an ex post incentive compatible strategy as long as 1= (I 1).
If the (negative) externality falls below this threshold, then the single crossing condition ceases to hold.
Within the generalized VCG mechanism, we can de ne for every agent i an ex post best response as a mapping from the true payo types of all agents and the reported types of all agents but i into a report of agent i: b i : i ! i . The net payo of agent i, given that he has type i , but reports himself to be of type m i and that he has a point conjecture that other agents have type pro le i and report their types to be m i is a constant (1 + (I 1)) times:
The ex post best response of agent i is simply the solution to the rst order condition of the above payo function with respect to m i :
In other words, the best response by i to a (mis)report m i by the other agents is to report a type so that the aggregate type from his point of view is exactly identical to the true aggregate type (under the aggregation function h i ( ) of agent i) generated by the true type pro le . We note that the above calculation also veri es the strict ex post incentive compatibility of f , since setting m i = i is a best response if m j = j for all j 6 = i.
Whether there are strategic complements or substitutes plays an important role in determining the role of the common prior in implementation. We say that the strategies of i and j are strategic complements if 8i; j; 8 ; 8m: @b i ( ; m j ; m ij ) =@m j > 0, and they are strategic substitutes if 8i; j; 8 ; 8m: In this note, we contrast the uniqueness result with incomplete information rationalizability with the incomplete information correlated equilibrium case. We use results regarding the uniqueness of the incomplete information correlated equilibrium in potential games derived in Bergemann and Morris (2007a) . We say that a belief free incomplete information game = fI,
for all i, a i ; a 0 i 2 A i , a i 2 A i and 2 . This is an incomplete information generalization of the de nition of a weighted potential in Monderer and Shapley (1996) ; in particular, it is equivalent to requiring that each complete information game (u i ( ; )) I i=1 is a weighted potential game in the sense of Monderer and Shapley (1996) , using the same weights for each 2 . We say that v is a strictly concave potential if v ( ; ) is a strictly concave function of a for all 2 . In Bergemann and Morris (2007a) we show that if has a strictly concave smooth potential function and an ex post equilibrium s , then 8i; 8 i ; s i ( i ) = C i ( i ) : In the direct mechanism, the set of actions is the set of types. We argued earlier that the direct mechanism has truthtelling as an ex post equilibrium provided that 1= (I 1). By the result in Bergemann and Morris (2007a), the su ciency condition for a unique correlated equilibrium can then be established by verifying that there exists a potential of the direct mechanism which is strictly concave.
Proposition 1 (Incomplete Information Correlated Equilibrium)
The set of incomplete information correlated equilibrium actions for all i and
Proof. We rst establish the su ciency result. We consider the following function v (m; ) as a potential function for the direct mechanism:
The partial derivative of the function v (m; ) with respect to m i is:
and the cross derivatives are given by:
It follows from (6) ;^ 3 ; ::;^ I )) = 1. It is easy to verify that the equilibrium conditions (4) will be satis ed at . We observe that for > 1, the equilibrium condition (4) will be corner solution and hence there will be strict inequalities for i = 1; 2.
Taken together, our results in Bergemann and Morris (2007c) The public good example shows how large the gap between robust implementation with or without common prior can be. In particular, as the number of agents increases, essentially only the private value model with = 0 can be robustly implemented without a common prior, but the interdependent model can be robustly implemented with a common prior for all < 1. This shows that the role of the common prior is critical in many mechanism design environments and for our understanding of robust implementation.
Discussion
Strategic Complements and Strategic Substitutes In the linear best response environment of the public good problem, the notions of strategic complement and strategic substitute emerged directly from the best response. In general environments with di erentiable mechanisms, the link between the information externality and the strategic properties of the reports remain to hold.
For preciseness, if we assume the following supermodularity conditions to support ex post incentive compatibility, @f =@ i > 0; @ 2 u i =@x@ i > 0, then locally at truthful reporting, the strategies of the agents are strategic substitutes if @ 2 u i =@x@ j > 0 and strategic complements if @ 2 u i =@x@ j < 0.
Potential and Mechanism Design Our proof that there is a unique incomplete information correlated equilibrium action for each payo type if 2 1 I 1 ; 1 used the fact that we could construct a potential function for the direct mechanism. This turns out to be a very strong property. In a di erentiable environment, it is straightforward to show that a su cient condition for Bayesian potential games is that the cross derivatives of the agent i and j equalizes at every true and reported type pro le. While the cross derivative is equal to zero in the current linear quadratic environment (because f is linear), 
